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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) mitigates or 
contributes to stock price crash risk.  Crash risk, defined as the conditional skewness of return 
distribution, captures asymmetry in risk and is important for investment decisions and risk 
management.  If socially responsible firms commit to a high standard of transparency and engage 
in less bad news hoarding, they would have lower crash risk.  However, if managers engage in 
CSR to cover up bad news and divert shareholder scrutiny, CSR would be associated with higher 
crash risk.  Our findings support the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk.  We find that firms' 
CSR performance is negatively associated with future crash risk after controlling for other 
predictors of crash risk.  The result holds after we account for potential endogeneity.  Moreover, 
the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk is more pronounced when firms have less effective 
corporate governance or a lower level of institutional ownership.  The results are consistent with 
the notion that firms that actively engage in CSR also refrain from bad news hoarding behavior 
and thus reducing crash risk.  This role of CSR is particularly important when governance 
mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak.    
 
JEL classification: G14; G30; M14; M40  
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Crash Risk; Financial Reporting Transparency  
 
 
 
 
We appreciate the comments and suggestions of Ike Mathur (editor), an anonymous reviewer, 
Yinghua Li, workshop participants at Santa Clara University, and the reviewer and participants 
of the 2012 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. Parts of this paper were 
completed while Kim was visiting Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 In recent years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a dominant theme 
in the business world.  Many companies have expressed CSR commitments, initiated CSR 
projects, established CSR committees, and issued CSR reports.  As CSR becomes a mainstream 
business activity, it is being promoted as a core area of management, next to marketing, 
accounting, or finance (Crane et al., 2008).  In response to the rising popularity of CSR in 
practice, there is a growing multidisciplinary literature on CSR and its impact on firm actions 
and outcomes.  A large number of studies have investigated the link between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance (e.g., Roman et al., 1999; Margolis and Walsh, 
2001; Jiao, 2010; Kim and Statman, 2012).  Other studies examine the association between CSR 
and firm risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009).  Some recent studies investigate the association between 
CSR and cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss and Roberts, 
2011).   
In this study, we examine the relation between CSR and firm-specific stock price crash 
risk.  Following Chen et al. (2001), we define crash risk as the conditional skewness of return 
distribution, rather than the likelihood of extreme negative returns.1  Conditional skewness, like 
mean and median, is an important characteristic of return distribution.  Unlike prior studies that 
focus on stock performance and firm risk, which capture the mean (first moment) and variance 
(second moment) of return distribution, we focus on conditional skewness, the third moment of 
return distribution.  Crash risk captures asymmetry in risk, especially downside risk, thus is 
                                                 
1 Chen et al. (2001) warn that (p. 348): "Thus, when we speak of ‘forecasting crashes’ in the title of the paper, we 
are adopting a narrow and euphemistic definition of the word ‘crashes,’ associating it solely with the conditional 
skewness of the return distribution; we are not in the business of forecasting negative expected returns.”  Chen et al. 
point out that this definition follows Bates (1991), who relies on conditional skewness (inferred from the option 
markets in his case) to measure expectations of stock market crash. 
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important for investment decisions and risk management.  As discussed below, our study builds 
on prior research that attempts to predict firm-specific stock price crash risk and another stream 
of research that examines the relation between CSR and financial reporting transparency.  
It has been well documented that the distribution of stock returns exhibits negative 
skewness; that is, large negative stock returns, or stock price crashes, are more common than 
large positive stock price movements (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hong and Stein, 2003).  Several 
studies have attempted to forecast firm-specific crash risk.  One factor that emerges from the 
literature as a prominent predictor of stock price crash risk is the managerial tendency to 
withhold bad news from investors (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009).  These studies 
contend that managers withhold bad news from investors due to career and compensation 
concerns, and when bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point, all bad news comes out at 
once leading to a stock price crash.  Supporting this view, empirical evidence suggests that 
opaque financial reporting, corporate tax avoidance, and executive equity incentives are 
positively associated with firm-specific crash risk, while accounting conservatism reduces such 
risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a and 2011b; Kim and Zhang, 2013). 
Prior studies present different views on the implications of CSR for managers’ bad news 
hoarding behavior and transparency in corporate financial reporting.  Kim et al. (2012) find that 
socially responsible firms also behave responsibly in financial reporting and exhibit less 
evidence of earnings management, suggesting that firms’ commitment to higher ethical standards 
has a positive impact on accounting information quality.  In a similar vein, Gelb and Strawser 
(2001) find that firms that undertake socially responsible activities provide more financial 
disclosure, consistent with the notion that companies consider increased disclosure as a form of 
socially responsible behavior in their overall implementation of CSR practices.  If firms with 
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better CSR cultures maintain the same high level of ethical standards in financial reporting, they 
are likely to be associated with a higher level of transparency and are less likely to conceal bad 
news from investors.  Thus we would expect these firms to be associated with lower stock price 
crash risk.   
On the other hand, there is a long-standing concern that managers may use CSR 
opportunistically to advance their careers or other personal agenda.  Friedman (1970) is among 
the first to express concern that CSR represents a form of agency problem within the firm.  
Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that one motivation for companies to adopt CSR is to 
cover up corporate misbehavior.  Enron, for example, was widely respected as a model for the 
CSR movement and won several national awards for its environmental and community programs 
while at the same time engaging in massive accounting frauds that lead to its collapse in 2001 
(Bradley, 2009).  Consistent with this view, some studies find a positive relation between CSR 
and earnings management (Petrovits, 2006; Prior et al., 2008).  If firms use CSR as a tool to 
disguise bad news and divert shareholder scrutiny, CSR would be associated with higher, not 
lower, stock price crash risk.     
To test these two opposing views of the relation between CSR and stock price crash risk, 
we examine how firms’ CSR performance is associated with future stock price crash risk.  Our 
CSR performance measure is based on the social ratings data provided by the MSCI ESG 
database.  Following prior studies, we measure firm-specific crash risk by the negative skewness 
of firm-specific weekly returns and the asymmetric volatility of negative and positive stock 
returns (e.g., Chen et al., 2001).  Using a large sample of U.S. public firms from 1995 to 2009, 
we find a significantly negative association between firms' CSR performance and one-year-ahead 
stock price crash risk, suggesting that socially responsible firms have a lower future stock price 
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crash risk.  The results are robust after controlling for other predictors of future stock price crash 
risk identified in prior studies, including divergence of investor opinion, past returns, firm size, 
and accounting opaqueness.  To mitigate concerns on endogeneity, we add additional control 
variables that may affect both CSR and crash risk, and employ the instrumental variables 
approach and the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method.  Our results hold 
after addressing endogeneity using these tests. 
In addition, we investigate whether the negative relation between CSR and future stock 
price crash risk is affected by the effectiveness of corporate governance and the level of 
institutional ownership.  We find that when firms have less effective corporate governance 
(indicated by lower governance ratings by MSCI ESG, CEO being the chairman of the board, 
and lower shareholder rights based on the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index) or a lower 
level of long-term institutional ownership, the negative relation between CSR and future crash 
risk is significant.  On the other hand, when firms have more effective corporate governance or a 
higher long-term institutional ownership, CSR does not appear to have a significant impact on 
crash risk.  The results are consistent with the notion that the role of CSR in reducing stock price 
crash risk is particularly important when internal monitoring by the boards or external 
monitoring by institutional investors is weak.  The results also address a potential concern that 
the negative relation between CSR and crash risk might reflect the effect of corporate 
governance; specifically, CSR firms may have more effective corporate governance, which in 
turn may limit bad news hoarding behavior and reduce stock price crash risk (Harjoto and Jo, 
2011; Andreou et al., 2012).  We find that the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk is present 
only for firms with weak governance, suggesting that the negative relation between CSR and 
crash risk is not driven by CSR firms having more effective corporate governance.  Overall, the 
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evidence in our study supports the notion that managers operating in a strong CSR-oriented 
corporate culture show a lower tendency to conceal bad news, leading to lower stock price crash 
risk.   
Our study makes several contributions.  First, our study adds to the growing literature on 
CSR and its economic consequences.  As discussed earlier, much work in this area has focused 
on the impact of CSR on firm performance and, to a lesser extent, firm risk.  We depart from 
these studies and focus on the unique role of CSR in reducing crash risk, which captures 
asymmetry in risk or the third moment of stock return distribution.  This role is distinct from the 
effect of CSR on stock return performance (first moment) or firm risk (second moment) 
documented in prior studies.  Our results thus broaden our understanding of the implications of 
CSR on firms and investors.  Our study also adds to the growing literature that examines CSR 
issues in the financial reporting contexts (e.g., Kim et al., 2012).      
Second, our study extends prior research that attempts to forecast future stock price crash 
risk (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hong and Stein, 2003; Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; 
Kim et al., 2011a and 2011b; Kim and Zhang, 2013).  Crash risk is an important characteristic of 
return distribution that is relevant to portfolio theories, asset-pricing, and option-pricing models.  
Sunder (2010) argues that crash risk cannot be mitigated through portfolio diversification, unlike 
the risk from symmetric volatilities.  Harvey and Siddique (2000) suggest that conditional 
skewness is a priced factor.  They find that investors command higher expected returns for stocks 
with more negative skewness as a reward for accepting this risk.  Since crash risk captures 
asymmetry in risk, it is important for investment decisions and risk management.  The stock 
market turbulence in recent years further highlights the importance of crash risk to investors.  We 
extend prior studies by identifying a new factor that mitigates future stock price crash risk.  Our 
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study will be useful to firms and shareholders who want to manage tail risk in the stock market 
and to investors who want to incorporate crash risk in their portfolio and risk management 
decisions.          
We discuss prior research in Section 2.  Section 3 discusses the sample, variable 
measurements, and research design.  Section 4 presents empirical results.  Additional analysis is 
reported in Section 5.  We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Research issues  
 There are a wide variety of definitions of CSR proposed by practitioners and academics.  
For example, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) define CSR as “the 
commitment of businesses to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with 
employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their lives in ways 
that are good for business and for development.”2   Carroll (1979) defines CSR as “social 
responsibility of business that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time.”  Many definitions of CSR 
center on the notion of voluntary actions taken by firms that reflect ethical values, legal 
compliance, and aim at improving social or environmental conditions.   
 As CSR becomes increasingly important in businesses, the literature on CSR is also 
growing.  A large number of studies examine the motives for and determinants of CSR, as well 
as the economic consequences of CSR.  An issue that receives particular attention is whether 
companies that “do good” also “do better” (e.g., Roman et al., 1999; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; 
Jiao, 2010; Kim and Statman, 2012).  Recently a growing number of studies look beyond the link 
                                                 
2 http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/content/csr-intropage. 
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between CSR and financial performance and examine the impact of CSR in other dimensions of 
firm actions and outcomes, for example, firm risk  (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009), cost of capital (e.g., 
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011), and financial reporting 
(e.g., Gelb and Strawser, 2001; Petrovits, 2006; Prior et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012). 
 The papers that examine the relation between CSR and financial reporting transparency 
are closely related to our study.  The debate is whether CSR activities lead to more transparent 
financial reporting or whether they enable managers to extract rents and are associated with a 
lower level of transparency.  Many proponents of CSR argue that CSR activities signal a higher 
ethical and moral standard of managers.  Managers' tendency to operate with integrity and to “do 
the right things” can also have a positive impact on firms' financial accounting and reporting.  
Supportive of this view, Kim et al. (2012) find that socially responsible firms exhibit less 
evidence of both accruals-based and real-activity earnings management.  Gelb and Strawser 
(2001) find that socially responsible firms provide more financial disclosure.   
 Other studies, however, take an agency-cost perspective and express a negative view on 
managerial motivations for pursuing CSR (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Friedman, 1970; 
Carroll, 1979; McWilliams et al., 2006).  These studies argue that managers use CSR to extract 
rents, such as advancing their careers or pursuing other personal agenda.  Managers that engage 
in CSR to extract rents are less likely to have incentives to maintain transparent information 
environment.  Moreover, Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that firms may use CSR to 
cover up other corporate misbehavior.  Using CSR as a form of reputation insurance, firms may 
divert shareholder attention and scrutiny on their improper behavior.  A few empirical studies 
find evidence suggesting that CSR is associated with less transparent and reliable accounting 
information.  Petrovits (2006) finds that firms use corporate philanthropy programs strategically 
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to achieve earnings targets.  Prior et al. (2008) find a positive relation between CSR and earnings 
management for regulated firms.   
 Several recent studies point to financial reporting opacity as a prominent predictor of the 
likelihood of firms experiencing extreme negative stock returns.  Jin and Myers (2006) find that 
stocks in countries with high financial reporting opacity are more likely to crash.  Hutton et al. 
(2009) find a similar positive relation between opacity of financial reports (measured by earnings 
management) and stock price crashes for a sample of U.S. firms.  Kim et al. (2011a and 2011b) 
examine other factors that affect financial reporting opacity, namely, corporate tax avoidance and 
executive equity incentives, and find that both have predictive power for future stock price crash 
risk.  The underlying notion in these studies is that managers at opaque firms stockpile bad news 
until when they can no longer hide it from investors, at which point all accumulated negative 
information becomes public at once, resulting in a stock price crash.    
Building on the literature on CSR and the literature on crash risk, we conjecture that CSR 
can affect firm-level stock price crash risk.  Whether CSR can mitigate or contribute to crash risk, 
however, is ultimately an empirical question.  Our empirical analysis will shed light on this 
important issue.   
 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1. The sample  
 Our initial sample consists of corporate social ratings data from the MSCI ESG database, 
formerly known as the Kinder, Lyndenberg, and Domini Research and Analytics Inc. (KLD) 
database.  The MSCI ESG data have been used extensively in academic research and are widely 
accepted as an objective measure of corporate social performance (e.g., Szwajkowski and 
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Figlewicz, 1999; Chatterji et al., 2009).  According to MSCI ESG, 31 of the top 50 institutional 
money managers worldwide use their research to integrate CSR factors into their investment 
decisions.  We obtain MSCI ESG data from 1994 to 2008, and then match the MSCI ESG data 
with the 1995-2009 stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to 
compute one-year ahead stock price crash risk.  Our sample period includes two five-year stock 
market boom periods (1995-1999 and 2003-2007), each followed by a burst period (2000-2002 
and 2008-2009, respectively).3  We further require financial data to be available in Compustat, 
and delete firms with year-end share prices below $1 or those with fewer than 26 weeks of return 
data so that our results are not influenced by stocks with low liquidity.  Finally, we exclude firms 
in the regulated industries (i.e., financial and utility).4  These data requirements yield a final 
sample of 12,978 firm-years from 1995 to 2009. 
 
3.2. Corporate social responsibility measure  
 MSCI ESG evaluates a company’s CSR based on seven qualitative categories and six 
exclusionary screens.  The seven qualitative categories include community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and products.  For each of 
these categories, MSCI ESG assigns positive and negative ratings (i.e., strengths and concerns) 
of the company based on a predetermined set of criteria, and the overall rating for each category 
is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns.5  The six exclusionary screens are alcohol, 
                                                 
3 We re-estimate our models for the 2000-2002 and 2008-2009 crisis periods and find that our results hold during 
these two periods. 
4 We exclude firms in the financial and utility industries following prior studies that examine the relation between 
financial reporting opacity and crash risk (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009).  All of our inferences remain unchanged after 
including financial and utility companies in our sample. 
5 For example, in the community category, strength or positive indicators include charitable giving, innovative 
giving, support for housing and education, volunteer programs, and other strength; concern or negative indicators 
 
 10
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco.  MSCI ESG assigns only negative 
ratings (i.e., concerns) on these exclusionary screens.    
 Following prior studies (e.g., Chatterji et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012), our CSR measure is 
an aggregate CSR score to capture firm-level social responsibility based on five areas of 
strength/concern ratings MSCI ESG assigns to each company (CSR_SCORE).  We first calculate 
the CSR net counts as total strengths minus total concerns in the following five categories: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product.  We then transform CSR 
net counts to create CSR_SCORE that ranges from zero to one to facilitate comparison of CSR 
scores across years.  We use a transformation that preserves the relative distance between CSR 
net count for firms within the same industry (based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification) for each year using the following formula, where CSR refers to CSR net counts as 
defined above:   
CSR_SCORE for firm i in year t =  
 (CSR for firm i in year t – Min. CSR for firm i’s industry in year t) __________________________________________________________________ 
(Max. CSR for firm i’s industry in year t – Min. CSR for firm i’s industry in year t) 
 
We exclude the corporate governance dimension from our CSR score because it is 
distinct from the social and environmental dimensions represented by other categories.  We also 
exclude human rights following prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2012).  Excluding the corporate 
governance and human rights categories from the CSR score makes our measure comparable to 
those in earlier studies.  We examine the corporate governance and human rights categories 
separately in our supplemental analysis.  We do not consider the exclusionary screens in our 
CSR score, as they do not reflect firms’ discretionary implementation of CSR practices. 
                                                                                                                                                             
include investment controversies, negative economic impact, tax disputes, and other concerns.  Strengths and 
concerns indicators for other categories are provided in Appendix B.       
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3.3. Crash risk measures  
 We employ two measures of firm-specific crash risk, following Chen et al. (2001).6  Both 
measures are based on firm-specific weekly returns estimated as the residuals from the market 
model.  Using firm-specific returns ensures that our crash risk measures reflect firm-specific 
factors rather than broad market movements.  Specifically, we estimate the following expanded 
market model regression: 
,,2,,51,,4,,31,,22,,1, τττττττ εβββββα jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr ++++++= ++−−                                   (1) 
where τ,jr  is the return on stock j in week τ , and τ,mr  is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in week τ .  The lead and lag terms for the market index return is included to allow 
for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979).  The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week 
τ  ( τ,jW ) is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from equation (1).7   
 Our first measure of crash risk is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year (NCSKEW).  NCSKEW is calculated by taking the negative of 
the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each year and normalizing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power.  Specifically, for each firm j 
in year t, NCSKEW is calculated as: 
 ∑ ∑−−−−= ,]))(2)(1/[(])1([ 2/32,3,2/3, ττ jjtj WnnWnnNCSKEW                                         (2) 
                                                 
6 These measures are also used in other studies that examine stock price crash risk, such as Kim et al. (2011a and 
2011b) and Kim and Zhang (2013). 
7 The residuals from equation (1) is highly skewed, hence the log transformation is performed to obtain a more 
symmetric distribution (Hutton et al., 2009). 
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where τ,jW  is firm-specific weekly return as defined above, and n is the number of weekly 
returns during year t.  A negative sign is put in front of the third moment such that a higher value 
of NCSKEW indicates higher crash risk.   
Our second measure of crash risk is the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL) of the 
crash likelihood.  For each firm j over a fiscal-year period t, firm-specific weekly returns are 
separated into two groups: “down” weeks when the returns are below the annual mean, and “up” 
weeks when the returns are above the annual mean.  Standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns is calculated separately for each of these two groups, and DUVOL is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the standard deviation in the “down” weeks to the standard deviation in the “up” 
weeks: 
},)1()1(log{ 2,
2
,, ∑∑ −−=
Up
jd
Down
jutj WnWnDUVOL ττ                                                           (3) 
where un  and dn  are the number of up and down weeks in year t, respectively.  A higher value 
of DUVOL indicates greater crash risk.  As suggested in Chen et al. (2001), DUVOL does not 
involve third moments, and hence is less likely to be overly influenced by extreme weekly 
returns. 
   
3.4. Empirical models  
 To investigate how CSR is associated with firm-specific future stock price crash risk, we 
estimate the following model: 
CRASH_RISKt = β0 + β1(CSR_SCOREt-1) + β2(CRASH_RISKt-1) + β3(DTURNOVER t-1) 
+ β4(RETt-1) + β5(MBt-1) + β6(SIZE t-1) + β7(SIGMARt-1) + β8(LEVt-1)  
+ β9(ROAt-1) + β10(ABACCt-1) + βm(DIndustry) + βn(DYear) + εt,         (4) 
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where the dependent variable, CRASH_RISK, is proxied by NCSKEW or DUVOL; our primary 
independent variable is CSR_SCORE as discussed above.  We impose a one-year lag between the 
dependent and independent variables to test whether CSR in year t-1 can predict crash risk in 
year t.   
We control for several factors that have been shown to affect future stock price crash risk 
in prior studies.  We first control for the lag value of CRASH_RISK to account for the potential 
serial correlation of NCSKEW or DUVOL for the sample firms.  Chen et al. (2001) show that 
trading volume, a proxy for the intensity of differences of opinion among investors, is a predictor 
of stock price crash risk.  We thus control for change in trading volume (DTURNOVER), 
calculated as the average monthly share turnover in year t minus the average monthly share 
turnover in t – 1.  In addition to trading volume, Chen et al. (2001) find that past returns also help 
to forecast crash risk.  The predictive power of past returns can be explained by a bubble buildup 
as indicated by high past returns, followed by a large price drop when prices fall back to 
fundamentals.  We thus control for past returns (RET), calculated as the mean of firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year.  For the similar reason, we control for the market-to-book 
ratio (MB), as glamour stocks (those with a high MB) are also predicted to have higher crash risk.  
The predictive power of firm size has been documented in several studies (e.g., Harvey and 
Siddique, 2000; Chen et al., 2001), hence we control for firm size (SIZE), calculated as the log 
value of the market value of equity.  The next control variable is stock volatility (SIGMA), 
calculated as the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, as more 
volatile stocks are likely to be more crash prone.  In addition, we control for financial leverage 
(LEV), calculated as total long-term debts divided by total assets, and profitability measured by 
return on assets (ROA).  Our last control variable is abnormal accruals, a proxy for earnings 
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management, as Hutton et al. (2009) show that earnings management is positively related to 
future crash risk.  We measure abnormal accruals as the residuals from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995), estimated by each year and each 2-digit SIC code industry.  We use the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABACC) in our regression analysis. Appendix A provides 
definitions of all variables used in our analysis. 
We note that some of the control variables, including past returns, growth as proxied by 
the market-to-book ratio, firm size, profitability, and earnings management, have also been 
shown to affect CSR performance in prior studies, thus providing another reason for controlling 
for their potential impact in our regressions.  All of our regressions also include industry and 
year fixed effects.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
 Table 1 reports the sample distribution by year.  The table shows that the sample size 
increases markedly in 2004, which is due to the expanded coverage of the MSCI ESG database 
in 2003.8  Both crash risk measures (NCSKEW and DUVOL) indicate a considerable variation 
across years, with 2008 having the highest crash risk, a reflection of the financial crisis, and 2009 
having the lowest crash risk.  The average CSR score is considerably smaller for the 2004-2009 
period relative to the 1995-2003 period.  One possible reason is that, the companies that were 
added to the MSCI ESG expanded coverage in 2003 on average have lower CSR scores relative 
to those for companies that were already under MSCI ESG coverage before 2003.   
                                                 
8 Note that the CSR measures are lagged by one year, so CSR measures in 2003 is used to predict crash risk in 2004. 
 15
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis.  The mean 
values of the crash risk measures, NCSKEW and DUVOL, are 0.035 and -0.002, respectively.  
The mean NCSKEW and DUVOL are similar to the estimates in Kim et al. (2011b), but are much 
higher than those reported in Chen et al. (2001), possibly due to the different sample period.  The 
sample firms have an average CSR score of 0.404.  The average change in monthly trading 
volume (as a percentage of shares outstanding) is 0.018.  The average firm in our sample has a 
firm-specific weekly return of -0.155 percent, a market capitalization of $1,634 million, a 
market-to-book ratio of 3.369, a weekly return volatility of 0.050, a leverage of 0.173, and a 
return on assets of 0.039.  The average absolute value of abnormal accruals is 0.324.  In addition 
to the variables used in our main regression analysis, we have constructed the following 
variables used either as additional controls or as partitioning variables in supplementary analysis.  
On average the sample firms have a 73% institutional ownership.  The extent of insider 
transactions is measured as the net volume of trading by insiders, ranked and scaled to range 
between zero and one, following Rogers and Stocken (2005).  This insider trading variable has a 
mean of 0.707.  The average number of analysts following a firm is nine.  About 56% of our 
sample has shareholder rights data available from the RiskMetics Database, and the average 
GINDEX is 9.152 for this sample.  The average book-tax difference, calculated as book income 
less taxable income scaled by lagged assets, has a mean of 0.007.  As mentioned earlier, one of 
the qualitative categories in the MSCI ESG database is corporate governance, based on which we 
construct a corporate governance variable measured as total strengths minus total concerns in 
this category, standardized in each industry for each year.  This measure has a mean value of 
0.555 for our sample firms.  Fifty-four percent of our sample firms have director data available 
from the RiskMetrics Database, and 63.7% of these firms have the CEO also serving as the 
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chairman of the board.  The average firm in our sample has a long-term institutional ownership 
of 55.3 percent.   
  
4.2. The effect of CSR on crash risk  
Table 3 reports results from regression analysis of the relation between CSR and future 
firm-specific crash risk after controlling for other potential determinants of crash risk.  All 
reported p-values are based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm 
and year levels (Petersen, 2009).  Results suggest that corporate social performance is negatively 
associated with one-year-ahead crash risk proxied by NCSKEW and DUVOL.  Column (1) 
indicates that NCSKEW is significantly and negatively associated with CSR_SCORE.  On 
average, an increase of one standard deviation in CSR_SCORE in year t-1 is associated with a 
decrease of 0.052 in NCSKEW in year t.  In comparison, the mean and median values of 
NCSKEW are 0.035 and -0.011, respectively.  Column (2) suggests that an increase of one 
standard deviation in CSR_SCORE in year t-1 is associated with a decrease of 0.010 in DUVOL 
in year t.  In comparison, the mean and median values of DUVOL are -0.002 and -0.010, 
respectively.  Thus, the effect of CSR on future crash risk is both statistically and economically 
significant.  The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies.  
Firms that have a higher past return, a higher market-to-book ratio, a larger firm size, a higher 
return volatility, and a higher ROA are associated with higher future crash risk.   
Overall, results in Table 3 suggest that socially responsible firms have a lower future 
stock price crash risk.  The results are consistent with the notion that socially responsible firms 
are less likely to hoard bad news and exhibit a higher level of transparency, leading to lower 
future stock price crash risk. 
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4.3. Endogeneity  
Our analysis so far suggests a negative relation between CSR and one-year-ahead crash 
risk.  However, the potential endogenous relation between CSR and crash risk is a concern in our 
analysis.  Endogeneity can arise due to unobservable heterogeneity when unobservable firm-
specific factors affect both CSR and crash risk.  In addition, while the use of lagged CSR to 
predict future crash risk in our research design potentially mitigates the problem of simultaneity 
or reverse causality, the concern of simultaneity still remains since CSR scores are quite sticky 
across years.  We conduct several tests to mitigate these endogeneity concerns.  We first include 
additional controls for variables that may affect both CSR and crash risk.  We also employ the 
instrumental variables approach and the dynamic GMM method to estimate the model.  Below 
we discuss these analyses in detail. 
To mitigate concerns on omitted correlated variables, we add to the model a number of 
variables that can potentially affect both CSR and crash risk based on prior studies.  Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2004) show that the activities of financial analysts, institutional investors, and 
insiders affect stock price synchronicity, suggesting that these activities influence the amount of 
information impounded into stock prices.  Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that firms’ 
antitakeover provisions affect the levels of idiosyncratic risk and information flow.  Kim et al. 
(2011a) find that the strength of external monitoring proxied by analyst coverage, institutional 
shareholding, and shareholder rights (measured as antitakeover provisions) affects the relation 
between tax avoidance and crash risk.  Based on these studies, we construct five variables:  
institutional ownership, insider trading, the number of analyst following, antitakeover provisions 
index (GINDEX based on Gompers et al., 2003), and tax aggressiveness proxied by the book-tax 
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income difference.  We obtain data on institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters’ 
Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, insider trading from Thomson Reuters’ Insider Filings 
Database, analyst following from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and 
antitakeover provisions from RiskMetrics’ Governance Database.  We first include each variable 
separately and then include all variables together in the regression model.  Table 4 reports results 
of this analysis.  We find that the coefficients on institutional ownership (PCT) and insider 
trading (INSIDER) are significantly positive when each variable is added to the model separately.  
When all five variables are included in the model, only the coefficient on PCT remains 
significantly positive.  This result is consistent with Callen and Fang (2011) who find a 
significantly positive relation between institutional ownership and crash risk.  More importantly, 
we find that the coefficients on CSR_SCORE remain significantly negative for both NCSKEW 
and DUVOL across all twelve models presented in the table.  Thus, our finding of a negative 
relation between CSR and future stock price crash risk is robust to including additional controls 
to mitigate the concern on omitted correlated variables. 
We also rely on two econometric approaches to further mitigate endogeneity concerns.  
The first approach is the instrumental variables method.  Following prior studies (e.g., El Ghoul 
et al., 2011), we use the average CSR_SCORE of other firms in the same Fama-French 48 
industry as the instrumental variable.  We report results of the instrumental variables approach in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.  The coefficients on the fitted value of CSR_SCORE are 
significantly negative for both NCSKEW and DUVOL, suggesting that the negative relation 
between CSR and future crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the 
instrumental variables methodology. 
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We next apply the dynamic panel GMM approach, which incorporates the dynamic 
relation between CSR and crash risk while accounting for other sources of endogeneity (Wintoki 
et al., 2012).  This method has been well developed in the economics literature and has recently 
been applied in corporate finance research to address potential endogeneity bias.  We report 
results from the dynamic GMM estimation in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.  We continue to find 
significantly negative coefficients on CSR_SCORE, suggesting that the negative relation between CSR 
and crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the dynamic GMM estimator. 
 
4.4. The effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on the relation between CSR 
and crash risk  
In this section we investigate whether the relation between CSR scores and future stock 
price crash risk varies with the level of corporate governance and ownership structure.  
Corporate governance and institutional investors provide internal and external monitoring of 
managers, and can have two different effects on the relation between CSR and crash risk.  On 
one hand, more effective monitoring can ensure that managers engage in socially responsible 
activities for genuine causes, rather than using CSR as a tool to disguise bad news.  Under this 
scenario, we expect effective monitoring from the boards and institutional investors to strengthen 
the negative relation between CSR and crash risk.  On the other hand, the commitment to CSR is 
more important in constraining earnings management when other governance mechanisms (such 
as monitoring by boards or institutional investors) are weak.  Bae et al. (2006) show that stocks 
in markets that have strong corporate governance mechanisms exhibit less positive return 
skewness than those in markets that have poor corporate governance, and one reason is that 
strong corporate governance leads to better information disclosure.  When strong monitoring 
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from boards or institutional investors is present to limit bad news hoarding behavior, the 
incremental effect of CSR on bad news hoarding, thus crash risk, might be limited.  Under this 
scenario, we expect the negative relation between CSR and crash risk to be more pronounced for 
firms with less effective corporate governance or a lower institutional ownership.   
We use three measures to proxy for the effectiveness of corporate governance.  The first 
measure is based on the MSCI ESG ratings in the corporate governance category, calculated as 
total strengths minus total concerns in this category, standardized in each Fama-French 48 
industry for each year (GOV).  The MSCI ESG strength indicators in the corporate governance 
category include: limited compensation to top management or board members; ownership 
strength (either owns or is owned by a socially responsible firm); transparency strength (effective 
reporting of social and environmental performance); and political accountability (responsible 
leadership or involvement in public policy issues).  The concern indicators include weak 
performance in the abovementioned areas, that is, high compensation, ownership concern, 
transparency concern, political accountability concern, as well as a new area—accounting 
concern, aimed at capturing a company's involvement in significant accounting-related 
controversies. 
The second measure is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR) according to RiskMetrics’ Directors 
Database.  CEO-chair duality signals greater CEO power and potential entrenchment problems.  
Prior studies suggest that firms with CEO-chair duality exhibit more earnings management (e.g., 
Dechow et al., 1996).  The third measure is the governance index (GINDEX) as developed in 
Gompers et al. (2003).  The governance index is a summary measure of corporate governance 
based on 24 firm-specific anti-takeover and charter provisions, and is widely used in the finance 
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and accounting literature as a proxy for restrictions on shareholder rights or management 
entrenchment (e.g., Bates et al., 2008).     
To investigate the relation between CSR and crash risk conditional on corporate 
governance, we re-perform our regression analysis after partitioning the sample based on the 
median values of the governance variables as described above, and report the results in Table 6.  
Panel A reports the results based on the MSCI ESG governance variable (GOV).  We find a 
significantly negative coefficient on CSR_SCORE when firms have weak governance.  When 
firms have strong governance, however, the relation between CSR and crash risk is insignificant.  
This result holds for both crash risk measures (i.e., NCSKEW and DUVOL).  In Panel B, we 
partition the sample based on CEO-chair duality.  We find that CSR_SCORE is significantly and 
negatively associated with crash risk (both NCSKEW and DUVOL) when the CEO also serves as 
the chair of the board.  For firms with separate CEOs and chairs, the relation is not significant.  
We report results based on GINDEX in Panel C.  Consistent with results in Panels A and B, the 
relation between CSR and crash risk is significantly negative for firms with above-median 
GINDEX; that is, when firms have weak shareholder rights, but is insignificant for those with 
strong shareholder rights.  The results are thus consistent across three governance variables and 
suggest that CSR is a strong predictor of future crash risk when firms have less effective 
corporate governance, but does not appear to have much impact on future crash risk when 
corporate governance is strong. 
To capture the level of monitoring by long-term institutional investors, we measure the 
percentage of common shares owned by dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions (LTINSTI), 
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following the classification in Bushee and Noe (2000).9  We partition our sample based on the 
median value of long-term institutional ownership and report the regression results for each 
partition in Panel D.  The coefficients on CSR_SCORE are significantly negative when long-term 
institutional ownership is low, but are insignificant when long-term institutional ownership is 
high.  This result holds for both NCSKEW and DUVOL. 
Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest that the role of CSR in mitigating 
managers’ tendency to hide bad news and thus reducing stock price crash risk is particularly 
important when governance mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, 
are weak.    
 
5. Additional analysis  
5.1. Domini 400 Social Index 
In our main analysis, our CSR measure is based on the strength/concern ratings MSCI 
ESG assigns to each company. Another measure of CSR performance used in prior studies is 
whether a company is a member of the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) (e.g., McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000; Kim et al., 2012).  The DSI 400 includes companies that have strong social 
responsibility performance relative to their industry peers and in relation to the broader market.  
MSCI ESG applies the six exclusionary screens to disqualify a company from inclusion in the 
index based on its industry membership (i.e., alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear 
power, and tobacco).  In addition, to be eligible for the index, companies must meet the 
                                                 
9 Bushee and Noe (2000) classify institutional investors into three categories based on their trading behavior: 
transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated investors.  Our measure excludes ownership by transient institutions that 
have short-term horizons and are less likely to provide effective monitoring.  
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minimum environmental, social, and governance performance standards as determined by MSCI 
ESG’s ratings in the seven qualitative dimensions as discussed earlier.10   
We examine whether our results are robust to this alternative measure of CSR and report 
the results in Table 7.  The test variable is CSR_DSI400, which is an indicator variable coded as 
one if the company is a member of the DSI 400, and zero otherwise.  As shown in columns (1) 
and (2), the coefficients on CSR_DSI400 are significantly negative, consistent with the results 
based on CSR_SCORE.  One potential issue with this analysis, however, is self-selection, since 
the inclusion of a firm in the Domini 400 index is motivated by firm-level CSR investment.  To 
address this concern, we employ the Heckman self-selection model and the propensity-score 
matching (PSM) model.11  We continue to find negative coefficients on CSR_DSI400 from both 
models, as reported in columns (3) to (6) in Table 7.  Thus the negative relation between 
CSR_DSI400 and crash risk is robust to corrections for the self-selection problem.  The results 
reinforce our previous findings of a negative relation between CSR_SCORE and crash risk and 
suggest that CSR has a mitigating effect on future stock price crash risk. 
 
5.2. CSR strengths and concerns 
Following prior studies, our CSR_SCORE variable is calculated based on total strengths 
minus total concerns of a firm’s CSR ratings.  However, strengths and concerns may capture 
different dimensions of a firm’s CSR performance, and may have a distinct effect on future stock 
price crash risk.  To investigate this issue, we decompose CSR_SCORE into CSR strengths and 
                                                 
10 In addition to social responsibility standards, MSCI ESG also imposes certain financial criteria such as earnings, 
stock prices, and shares outstanding, to ensure the investability of the index. 
11 Following Prior et al. (2008) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), we include the following determinants of CSR in 
the first stage model for both Heckman and PSM procedures: return on assets, stock return volatility, R&D, firm size, 
analyst following, Hirfindhal index, institutional ownership, leverage, financial resources (measured as cash flows 
over total assets), and industry and year fixed effects.  For PSM, for each DSI 400 firm, a non-DSI 400 firm with the 
closest propensity score is matched within caliper width of 0.1 without replacement. 
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CSR concerns and re-run our analysis.12  We find that the coefficients on CSR strengths are 
significantly negative, while the coefficients on CSR concerns are insignificant (results 
untabulated).  The result is consistent for both NCSKEW and DUVOL.  The result suggests that 
CSR strengths, rather than CSR concerns, are driving the negative relation between CSR_SCORE 
and future crash risk.  This finding is consistent with the notion that firms’ commitment to higher 
CSR performance contributes to lower future stock price crash risk.  
 
5.3. CSR components 
The CSR_SCORE variable used in our analysis is an aggregate measure that captures a 
firm's overall social performance in five qualitative categories, namely, community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, and product.  In this section we examine the effect of CSR 
score in each category on future crash risk.  Individual CSR score is computed as the sum of 
strengths minus the sum of concerns in each of the five categories and then standardized in each 
industry for each year.13  We find that the coefficient on CSR score in the environment category 
(CSR_ENV) in significantly negative when NCSKEW is the crash risk measure.  The coefficients 
on CSR score in other categories (except the product category) are all negative but are 
insignificant (results untabulated).  The results suggest that the negative relation between CSR 
and future stock price crash risk is mainly driven by the combined effects of CSR performance 
across all five categories, rather than by any single CSR category.14   
                                                 
12 We standardize CSR strength counts and concern counts in each Fama-French 48 industry for each year following 
the construction of CSR_SCORE.   
13 Appendix B provides a list of concern and strength items in the five CSR categories evaluated by MSCI ESG. The 
sample average for these five CSR components are 0.318 (community), 0.302 (diversity), 0.461 (employee relations), 
0.441 (environment), and 0.610 (product), respectively.   
14 Human rights are another MSCI ESG rating category.  As discussed earlier, we exclude human rights from our 
overall CSR score following prior studies.  To examine its impact on crash risk, we include a human right score in 
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6. Conclusions  
This study examines whether CSR mitigates or contributes to future stock price crash risk.  
If socially responsible firms commit to a high standard of financial reporting transparency and 
thus exhibit less bad news hoarding behavior, we would expect CSR to be associated with lower 
stock price crash risk.  On the other hand, if managers engage in CSR to cover up bad news and 
divert shareholder attention, CSR could be associated with higher crash risk. 
Our findings support the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk.  Specifically, we find a 
significantly negative association between firms' CSR performance and one-year-ahead stock 
price crash risk, after controlling for other determinants of stock price crash risk identified in 
prior studies, including divergence of investor opinion, past returns, firm size, and accounting 
opaqueness.  Our results are robust to various tests intended to account for potential endogeneity, 
including adding additional control variables to the model and employing the instrumental 
variables approach and the dynamic GMM method.   
In addition, we find that the mitigating effect of CSR on future crash risk is significant 
only when firms have less effective governance (i.e., lower corporate governance ratings by 
MSCI ESG, CEO being the chairman of the board, and lower shareholder rights) and a lower 
level of long-term institutional ownership.  The results are consistent with the notion that the role 
of CSR in reducing crash risk is particularly important when governance mechanisms, such as 
monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak.  These findings strengthen our 
inferences because they alleviate the concern that the negative relation between CSR and crash 
risk is driven by CSR firms having more effective corporate governance.  Overall, the evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
the regression and find that it is not significantly related to crash risk.  All other results hold after adding the human 
rights score. 
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in our study supports the notion that managers operating in a strong CSR-oriented corporate 
culture show a lower tendency to conceal bad news, leading to lower stock price crash risk.   
Our study adds to the growing literature on CSR and its implications on firms and 
investors.  We focus on the unique role of CSR in reducing crash risk and provide new evidence 
on the economic consequences of CSR.  We also extend prior studies on crash risk by identifying 
a new factor that has an incremental mitigating effect on future stock price crash risk.  Our study 
will be useful to firms and investors who want to manage crash risk in the stock market.          
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Appendix A 
Variable Definition 
 
Crash risk variables:  
NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. 
DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of down-week to up-week firm-specific 
weekly returns. 
For both crash risk variables, the firm-specific weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1 + residual), 
where the residual is from the following expanded market model regression: 
,,2,,51,,4,,31,,22,,1, τττττττ εβββββα jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr ++++++= ++−−                            
 
CSR Variables: 
CSR_SCORE is the net score of CSR rating based on the MSCI ESG data, measured as total 
strengths minus total concerns in five categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, and product, standardized in each Fama-French 48 industry for each year. 
CSR_DSI400 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is included in the 
Domini 400 Social Index in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Firm-level controls and conditional variables: 
DTURNOVER is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year minus the 
average monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal year, where monthly share 
turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month.  
RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, times 100. 
MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. 
LEV is long-term debts divided by total assets. 
ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
ABACC is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are 
estimated from the modified Jones model. 
PCT is the percentage institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Holdings 
(13F) Database. 
INSIDER is the ranked net volume of insider transactions scaled to range between 0 and 1 
according to Thomson Reuters’ Insider Filings Database. 
NUMEST is the number of analyst following from I/B/E/S. 
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Appendix A continued 
 
GINDEX is the number of anti-takeover provisions based on Gompers et al. (2003). Anti-
takeover provisions are obtained from RiskMerics’ Governance Database. 
BTD is the total book-tax difference, which equals book income less taxable income scaled by 
lagged assets. Book income is pre-tax income. Taxable income is calculated by summing 
current federal tax expense and current foreign tax expense and dividing by the statutory tax 
rate and then subtracting the change in net operating loss carryforwards. If current federal tax 
expense is missing, total current tax expense is calculated by subtracting deferred taxes, state 
income taxes, and other income taxes from total income taxes.   
GOV is the net governance score measured as total strengths minus total concerns in the 
governance category based on the MSCI ESG ratings data, standardized in each Fama-
French 48 industry for each year. 
CEOCHAIR is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise 
according to RiskMetrics’ Directors Database. 
LTINSTI is the ownership of dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions based on Bushee and Noe 
(2000). 
 
Others 
YEAR FE are indicator variables for years. 
INDUSTRY FE are indicator variables for industry membership based on two-digit SIC codes. 
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Appendix B 
CSR Concerns and Strengths in Five Qualitative Categories 
 
Concerns     Strengths 
 
Community   Investment Controversies   Charitable Giving 
Negative Economic Impact   Innovative Giving 
Tax Disputes     Non-US Charitable Giving 
Other Concern   Support for Housing 
     Support for Education 
Volunteer Programs 
Other Strength 
 
Diversity   Controversies     CEO Promotion 
Non-Representation    Board of Directors 
Other Concern    Work/Life Benefits 
Women Minority Contracting 
Employment of the Disabled 
Gay Lesbian Policies 
Other Strength 
 
Employee relations Union Relations    Union Relations 
Health and Safety Concern   No-Layoff Policy 
Workforce Reductions   Cash Profit Sharing 
Retirement Benefits Concern  Employee Involvement 
Other Concern    Retirement Benefits Strength 
Health and Safety Strength 
Other Strength 
 
Environment   Hazardous Waste    Beneficial Products and Services 
Regulatory Problems    Pollution Prevention Chemicals 
Ozone Depleting    Recycling 
Substantial Emissions   Clean Energy 
Agricultural Chemicals   Property, Plant and Equipment  
Climate Change    Management Systems  
Other Concern    Other Strength 
 
Product   Product Safety    Quality 
Marketing/Contracting Concern  R&D/Innovation 
Antitrust     Benefits to Economically 
Disadvantaged    Other Strength 
Other Concern     
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution 
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution and mean values of stock price crash risk and CSR measures by 
year. The sample includes 12,978 firm-year observations in 1995-2009.  See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 
Year Frequency Percent NCSKEWt DUVOLt CSR_SCOREt-1 
1995 340 2.62 -0.036 -0.039 0.520 
1996 361 2.78 -0.088 -0.072 0.470 
1997 344 2.65 -0.036 -0.040 0.465 
1998 341 2.63 0.015 -0.007 0.474 
1999 383 2.95 -0.056 -0.048 0.438 
2000 372 2.87 0.138 0.044 0.429 
2001 373 2.87 0.061 0.026 0.433 
2002 545 4.20 0.133 0.051 0.449 
2003 644 4.96 -0.030 -0.034 0.422 
2004 1,489 11.47 0.078 0.017 0.383 
2005 1,468 11.31 0.040 -0.003 0.370 
2006 1,546 11.91 0.023 -0.013 0.389 
2007 1,519 11.70 0.071 0.012 0.373 
2008 1,538 11.85 0.203 0.090 0.376 
2009 1,715 13.21 -0.133 -0.079 0.411 
Total   12,978 100 0.035 -0.002 0.404 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for measures of stock price crash risk, CSR variable, as well as 
control and conditional variables.  See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Variable N Mean p25 Median p75 Stdev 
Crash risk variables   
NCSKEWt 12,978 0.035 -0.426 -0.011 0.431 0.81
DUVOLt 12,978 -0.002 -0.248 -0.010 0.232 0.368
   
CSR variable   
CSR_SCORE t-1 12,978 0.404 0.214 0.364 0.556 0.247
   
Control and conditional variables   
NCSKEWt-1 12,978 0.073 -0.390 0.008 0.442 0.775
DUVOLt-1 12,978 0.015 -0.229 0.003 0.243 0.358
DTURNOVERt-1 12,978 0.018 -0.015 0.010 0.048 0.091
RETt-1 12,978 -0.155 -0.188 -0.096 -0.051 0.173
MBt-1 12,978 3.369 1.565 2.468 4.006 3.912
SIZEt-1 12,978 7.399 6.158 7.230 8.422 1.616
SIGMAt-1 12,978 0.050 0.032 0.044 0.062 0.025
LEVt-1 12,978 0.173 0.005 0.142 0.270 0.175
ROAt-1 12,978 0.039 0.013 0.059 0.105 0.143
ABACCt-1 12,978 0.324 0.064 0.207 0.517 0.302
PCT t-1 12,978 0.730 0.589 0.763 0.923 0.228
INSIDER t-1 12,978 0.707 0.444 0.889 1 0.285
NUMEST t-1 12,978 9.295 3 7 14 8.163
GINDEX t-1 7,318 9.240 7 9 11 2.57
BTD t-1 12,978 0.007 -0.017 0.015 0.047 0.140
GOV t-1 12,946 0.555 0.333 0.6 0.75 0.295
CEOCHAIR t-1 6,987 0.637 0 1 1 0.481
LTINSTI t-1 9,705 0.553 0.433 0.576 0.688 0.193
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis on the Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Crash Risk 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores on 
firm-level stock price crash risk. The sample includes 12,978 firm-year observations in 1995-2009. The 
two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year 
levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. =  NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
   
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.064** -0.027** 
 (0.018) (0.029) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.002   
 (0.733)   
DUVOLt-1   -0.003 
   (0.632) 
DTURNOVERt-1 0.016 0.000 
 (0.813) (0.994) 
RETt-1 0.895*** 0.449*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MBt-1 0.006** 0.003** 
 (0.010) (0.020) 
SIZEt-1 0.025*** 0.013*** 
 (0.010) (0.002) 
SIGMAt-1 6.727*** 3.208*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVt-1 -0.118 -0.051 
 (0.162) (0.150) 
ROAt-1 0.219** 0.130*** 
 (0.021) (0.001) 
ABACCt-1 0.007 0.004 
 (0.877) (0.816) 
     
Observations 12,978 12,978 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.032 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
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Table 4 
Regression Analysis with Additional Controls 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the effect of CSR scores on firm-level stock price crash risk after including additional controls. The two-
tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
                          
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.056** -0.023* -0.066** -0.028** -0.064** -0.027** -0.081** -0.037** -0.063** -0.027** -0.078** -0.036** 
 (0.039) (0.063) (0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.032) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.030) (0.018) (0.026) 
PCTt-1 0.143*** 0.066***         0.213*** 0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000) 
INSIDERt-1   0.046** 0.017*       0.035 0.012 
   (0.019) (0.071)       (0.356) (0.471) 
NUMESTt-1     0.001 -0.001     0.008 0.004 
     (0.909) (0.823)     (0.678) (0.615) 
GINDEXt-1       0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000 
       (0.747) (0.780)   (0.899) (0.922) 
BTDt-1         0.093 0.029 0.068 0.007 
         (0.221) (0.380) (0.405) (0.828) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Observations 12,978 12,978 12,978 12,978 12,978 12,978 7,318 7,318 12,978 12,978 7,318 7,318 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.034 0.026 0.032 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.029 0.026 0.032 0.024 0.030 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis to Address Endogeneity Concerns 
 
Table 5 presents the analysis to address endogeniety concerns on the effect of CSR scores on firm-level 
stock price crash risk. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the instrumental variable approach and 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the Dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
The two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year 
levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Industry IV Industry IV GMM GMM 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
  
CSR_SCORE_HATt-1 -0.032* -0.020**   
 (0.076) (0.030)   
CSR_SCOREt-1   -0.269** -0.119* 
   (0.041) (0.053) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.006  0.008  
 (0.401)  (0.612)  
DUVOLt-1  -0.000  0.003 
  (0.949)  (0.838) 
DTURNOVERt-1 0.042 0.015 0.106 0.051 
 (0.421) (0.621) (0.741) (0.734) 
RETt-1 1.104*** 0.564*** 1.016* 0.411 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) (0.154) 
MBt-1 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.017** 0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.017) 
SIZEt-1 0.036*** 0.021*** -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.650) (0.684) 
SIGMAt-1 7.472*** 3.799*** 6.179 2.372 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.241) 
LEVt-1 -0.182** -0.073* -0.224 -0.084 
 (0.044) (0.063) (0.281) (0.396) 
ROAt-1 0.150 0.100** 0.283 0.208 
 (0.120) (0.019) (0.328) (0.113) 
ABACCt-1 0.075** 0.028* 0.051 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.062) (0.660) (0.845) 
     
Observations 12,824 12,824 9,771 9,771 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.016 2,122 2,122 
Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
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Table 6 
Subsample Analysis on the Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Crash Risk 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results of subsample analysis on the effect of CSR scores on firm-level stock 
price crash risk. Panel A partitions the sample based on the median value of the MSCI ESG corporate 
governance scores, GOV, in year t-1; Panel B partitions the sample based on whether the CEO is the 
chairman of the board, CEOCHAIR, in year t-1; Panel C partitions the sample based on the median value of 
shareholder rights, GINDEX, in year t-1; and Panel D partitions the sample based on the median value of the 
ownership of dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions, LTINSTI, in year t-1. The two-tailed p-values, based 
on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: MSCI ESG corporate governance scores 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt NCSKEWt DUVOLt DUVOLt  
Partition = Weak governance 
(GOV<median) 
Strong governance
(GOV≥median) 
Weak governance 
(GOV<median) 
Strong governance
(GOV≥median) 
  
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.107*** -0.029 -0.045** -0.011 
 (0.004) (0.543) (0.015) (0.550) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.027*** -0.018**   
 (0.000) (0.011)   
DUVOLt-1   0.025** -0.026*** 
   (0.016) (0.000) 
DTURNOVERt-1 -0.024 0.011 -0.020 -0.001 
 (0.800) (0.908) (0.610) (0.987) 
RETt-1 0.690** 1.015*** 0.305** 0.534*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) 
MBt-1 0.004 0.007*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.188) (0.003) (0.189) (0.020) 
SIZEt-1 0.029*** 0.031** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.006) 
SIGMAt-1 4.666* 7.995*** 1.908 4.006*** 
 (0.080) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) 
LEVt-1 -0.023 -0.157* 0.003 -0.073** 
 (0.823) (0.062) (0.944) (0.043) 
ROAt-1 0.253* 0.214** 0.179*** 0.115*** 
 (0.061) (0.024) (0.002) (0.004) 
ABACCt-1 -0.024 0.021 -0.014 0.011 
 (0.667) (0.432) (0.571) (0.384) 
         
Observations 4,816 8,162 4,816 8,162 
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.022 0.041 0.028 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Panel B: CEO as the board Chairman 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt NCSKEWt DUVOLt DUVOLt 
Partition = 
CEO is the board 
Chairman 
(CEOCHAIR=1) 
CEO is not 
the board Chairman
(CEOCHAIR=0) 
CEO is the board 
Chairman 
(CEOCHAIR=1) 
CEO is not 
the board Chairman
(CEOCHAIR=0) 
     
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.131*** -0.028 -0.055*** -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.643) (0.003) (0.814) 
NCSKEWt-1 -0.019 0.042***   
 (0.176) (0.009)   
DUVOLt-1   -0.018 0.027 
   (0.141) (0.151) 
DTURNOVERt-1 -0.157 -0.245 -0.080 -0.133 
 (0.412) (0.194) (0.366) (0.197) 
RETt-1 1.118*** 1.649*** 0.630*** 0.834*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
MBt-1 -0.002 0.010** -0.001 0.004** 
 (0.602) (0.011) (0.390) (0.011) 
SIZEt-1 0.041*** 0.020 0.021*** 0.011* 
 (0.001) (0.155) (0.000) (0.087) 
SIGMAt-1 7.613** 10.864*** 4.052*** 5.359*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
LEVt-1 -0.045 0.268** 0.005 0.118*** 
 (0.716) (0.014) (0.925) (0.001) 
ROAt-1 0.544*** 0.085 0.287*** 0.036 
 (0.001) (0.633) (0.000) (0.653) 
ABACCt-1 0.002 -0.052 -0.012 -0.020 
 (0.983) (0.484) (0.722) (0.479) 
         
Observations 4,453 2,534 4,453 2,534 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.026 0.034 0.028 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Panel C: Shareholder rights 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt NCSKEWt DUVOLt DUVOLt  
Partition = 
Weak shareholder 
rights 
(GINDEX≥median) 
Strong 
shareholder rights
(GINDEX<median) 
Weak shareholder 
rights 
(GINDEX≥median) 
Strong 
shareholder rights
(GINDEX<median) 
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.126*** 0.010 -0.063*** 0.017 
 (0.005) (0.871) (0.001) (0.606) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.004 0.018   
 (0.660) (0.348)   
DUVOLt-1   0.003 -0.002 
   (0.749) (0.894) 
DTURNOVERt-1 -0.029 0.013 -0.006 -0.012 
 (0.885) (0.902) (0.942) (0.828) 
RETt-1 1.373*** 0.581** 0.666*** 0.346*** 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.003) 
MBt-1 0.001 0.005* 0.000 0.002** 
 (0.708) (0.056) (0.987) (0.014) 
SIZEt-1 0.052*** -0.009 0.026*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.524) (0.000) (0.790) 
SIGMAt-1 9.875*** 2.930 4.644*** 1.841* 
 (0.002) (0.188) (0.002) (0.051) 
LEVt-1 -0.133 -0.148 -0.067 -0.055 
 (0.206) (0.404) (0.161) (0.441) 
ROAt-1 0.148 0.353 0.089 0.177* 
 (0.266) (0.144) (0.229) (0.082) 
ABACCt-1 0.014 -0.025 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.843) (0.582) (0.838) (0.802) 
   
Observations 4,421 2,897 4,421 2,897
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.014 0.037 0.019 
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Panel D: Institutional holdings 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt NCSKEWt DUVOLt DUVOLt  
Partition = 
Low institutional 
holding 
(LTINSTI<median) 
High institutional 
holding 
(LTINSTI≥median) 
Low institutional 
holding 
(LTINSTI<median) 
High institutional 
holding 
(LTINSTI≥median) 
     
CSR_SCOREt-1 -0.148** -0.025 -0.067** -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.456) (0.016) (0.755) 
NCSKEWt-1 -0.028** 0.020   
 (0.021) (0.183)   
DUVOLt-1   -0.031*** 0.012 
   (0.008) (0.472) 
DTURNOVERt-1 0.194*** -0.158 0.080** -0.070 
 (0.005) (0.307) (0.016) (0.259) 
RETt-1 0.758*** 1.234*** 0.379*** 0.616*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
MBt-1 0.010** -0.001 0.004* -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.610) (0.068) (0.254) 
SIZEt-1 0.017 0.023* 0.008 0.013* 
 (0.194) (0.092) (0.148) (0.055) 
SIGMAt-1 5.529** 8.570*** 2.504** 4.191*** 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) 
LEVt-1 -0.173** -0.091 -0.083*** -0.039 
 (0.012) (0.507) (0.005) (0.468) 
ROAt-1 0.068 0.303 0.053 0.164* 
 (0.530) (0.191) (0.298) (0.077) 
ABACCt-1 0.025 -0.023 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.580) (0.675) (0.739) (0.858) 
         
Observations 4,852 4,853 4,852 4,853 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.028 0.024 0.036 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
 
 43
Table 7 
Alternative Measure of CSR 
 
Table 7 presents the analysis using an alternative CSR measure, CSR_DSI400. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of the effect of CSR_DSI400 on firm-level stock price crash risk, Columns 3 and 4 report the 
results of the Heckman procedure, and Columns 5 and 6 report the results of the  propensity-score matching 
(PSM) procedure. The two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster 
at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Main effect Heckman PSM 
Dep. Var. = NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
              
CSR_DSI400t-1 -0.034** -0.014** -0.343** -0.148* -0.033** -0.016** 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.036) (0.063) (0.047) (0.046) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.002  -0.003  0.015  
 (0.730)  (0.718)  (0.408)  
DUVOLt-1  -0.003  -0.008  0.010 
  (0.632)  (0.299)  (0.608) 
DTURNOVERt-1 0.017 0.001 0.043 0.010 0.093 0.035 
 (0.795) (0.975) (0.603) (0.791) (0.591) (0.552) 
RETt-1 0.893*** 0.448*** 0.890*** 0.435*** 1.177*** 0.589*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.009) 
MBt-1 0.006** 0.003** 0.006** 0.002* 0.002 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.043) (0.060) (0.585) (0.737) 
SIZEt-1 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.024** 0.013*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) 
SIGMAt-1 6.687*** 3.191*** 5.975*** 2.814*** 7.392** 3.738** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.011) 
LEVt-1 -0.119 -0.052 -0.137 -0.064 0.084 0.037 
 (0.159) (0.147) (0.131) (0.102) (0.427) (0.438) 
ROAt-1 0.217** 0.129*** 0.183 0.113** 0.276*** 0.175*** 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.114) (0.028) (0.003) (0.002) 
ABACCt-1 0.006 0.004 0.019 0.010 0.061 0.032 
 (0.889) (0.827) (0.715) (0.654) (0.568) (0.456) 
LAMBDA   0.181* 0.077   
   (0.066) (0.105)   
       
Observations 12,978 12,978 11,376 11,376 4,808 4,808 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.031 0.021 0.027 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
